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Industrialization fundamentally altered life in nineteenth century America. The 
free labor ideology of the era shaped labor activism by guiding it towards an “equal 
rights tradition,” which held that workers could use their civil and political rights 
to correct the ills wrought by industrialization. However, the growth of the wage-
labor system, and the vulnerabilities of wageworkers during times of depression, 
demonstrated the outdated potential of the equal rights tradition. The Industrial 
Army Movement of 1894 represented a shift in American labor activism as 
resistance through the ballot box, strikes and courts gave way to a national 
approach dedicated to appropriating the power of the federal government to aid 
unemployed industrial wageworkers. The Industrial Army Movement built upon 
prior political activism of the Populist People’s Party and the Knights of Labor-
affiliated Workingmen’s Parties, movements that also sought to wield political 
power to alleviate the dislocations caused by industrialization. Though the 
movement was unsuccessful in lobbying Congress to pass a government-funded 
jobs program to build infrastructural projects around the country, the Industrial 
Army Movement nevertheless represents a pivotal shift in the labor movement’s 
tactics and the increasingly central role the federal government would have to play 
















“We are all equal! Can it be so? 
Are the rich and happy, the poor in woe 
 The proud and the humble, the weak and the strong, 
 The champion of Right, and the champion of Wrong 
The smitten, and he who giveth the blow –  
All Equal? Can it be so? 
 
We Are equal! Can it be true? 
Are the martyr, and he that turneth the screw 
 The man who toileth from early morn, 
 Till night shades fall and is treated with scorn, 
And he hunger and toil ne’er knew 
All Equal! Can it be true? 
 
All men equal! Can it be real? 
That he who is crushed ‘neeth monopoly’s heel, 
 And the fiend who weareth the iron show, 
 And never a pang of pity knew, 
But jeers at them who mercy kneel 
All equal! Can it be real? 
 
All men equal! Is it a jest? 
What! The oppressor equal of the oppressed? 
 He whose palace doth pierce the skies, 
 And he who at night by the roadsides lies, 
The demon of hunger knawing his breast –  
These men equal? Is it a jest? 
 
All men equal! Yes, ‘tis true, 
And the poor are many, the rich are few, 
 But the rich are strong in their bags of gold, 
 And justice away from the poor is sold, 
And the poor won’t unite for their rights to sue, 
All men equal! Yes, ‘tis true 
 
We are all Equal! Every one, 
But Equality is crushed by robber Wrong, 
 Let the toilers arise in their might, 
 And handed together press on the good fight, 
Till the welkin shall echo with truth the glad song, 
‘We Are All equal, everyone!’”1 
 
                                                        




In mid April, 1894 at Avoca, Iowa, Charles T. Kelley informed local reporters 
why he and nearly one thousand unemployed workers were headed to Washington 
D.C. They intended, he explained, to unite with Jacob S. Coxey and the “Commonweal 
of Christ,” where Kelley hoped to lobby the United States Congress to create a 
publicly funded jobs program, hiring men at a living wage to build infrastructural 
projects. “If we can only get to Washington,” he said, “if we can let the law-makers 
see that we are breadwinners, honest, sincere, we will be successful in our mission, 
for our demands are not unreasonable.”2 Throughout the middle months of 1894, 
scores of jobless, wage-earning industrial workers descended upon Washington D.C. 
hoping to collectively stand before Congress to present a “petition in boots” in favor 
of various reforms to relieve the vast unemployment wrought by the Depression of 
1893. The Industrial Army Movement of 1894 was, thus, an amalgam of working 
people from all over the U.S. participating in a social movement to reclaim federal 
authority in the name of the American working class. And like their “Generals,” as 
the leaders of the movement were called, these jobless workingmen believed that if 
the leaders of the republic could see the vast suffering of industrial workers then 
they would legislate for laboring people. 
 The immediate context that spurred this movement was the devastating 
Depression of 1893, which gripped the nation for four years. A bust beginning in the 
railroad industry dragged the national economy into freefall leading to the failure of 
                                                        
2 Donald L. McMurry, Coxey’s Army; A Study of the Industrial Army Movement of 1894 (Seattle 
and London: University of Washington Press, 1929) pg. 183 
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fifteen thousand companies and nearly six hundred banks, leaving four million 
citizens looking for work out of total population of sixty five million.3 The resulting 
social calamity was unique, but highlights the major dislocations that defined the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century.  
As the United States transitioned from an agricultural to an industrial society, 
traditional patterns of work and community life radically altered. Crucial to this 
transformation was the advent of wage payment for labor. Compensating labor in 
wages put industrial workers in a precarious status, painfully highlighted during 
times of economic distress such as the Depression of 1893. But the Industrial Army 
Movement was not merely a revolt against lack of wages for all willing to work, but a 
protest against the political, legal and social structures of the age in which 
employment and workplace autonomy became increasingly dependent on 
management of large corporations and the whims of a free market economy.  
The livelihood of workers during the era was based on the availability wage-
earning employment, and its absence left few alternatives. Many historians, states 
Geoffrey Blodgett, have felt a “profound impatience with the Gilded Age for having 
not yet discovered the Welfare State.”4 With the Depression of 1873, and demands 
for public works to employ jobless men, the policy of the Grant Administration was 
                                                        
3 Frank B. Latham, The Panic of 1893; A Time of Strikes, Riots, Hobo Camps, Coxey’s Army, 
Starvation, Withering Droughts, and Fears of “Revolution” (New York: Franklin Watts Inc., 
1971) 
4 Charles W. Calhoun, “The Political Culture: Public Life and the Conduct of Politics” in The 
Gilded Age; Essays on the Origins of Modern America (Wilmington: A Scholarly Resource Inc. 
Imprint, 1996) pg. 188 
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that “it is no business of the government to find employment for people.”5 This 
continued to be federal policy throughout the period, sustained by a conviction 
among political and business elites that market activity underwent natural 
fluctuations but would ultimately provide employment for all willing to work. Even 
with the Depression of 1893, the concept of an interventionist state was far from 
accepted.  
 Middle-class opinion looked at the men who comprised the Industrial Army 
Movement with deep suspicion if not hostility. Representative of the movement’s 
detractors was General O. O. Howard, who argued that it would “not be difficult to 
find work already in demand for everyone of that rank and file.” While “gigantic 
efforts and sacrifices on the part of the capitalists, bankers and other business men 
could not avert” the financial catastrophe, these jobless marchers headed for 
Washington looking for handouts rather then available employment.6 Many voices 
in the media condescendingly referred to the men who comprised the movement as 
“tramps,” or vagabonds who traveled the country, stealing train rides and avoiding 
honest work. Not only were the members of the Industrial Army Movement tramps, 
but, according to Howard, they were led by socialists and anarchists. As the 
movement began and unfolded throughout 1894, many observers feared that there 
would be repeats of the social upheaval witnessed in the past few decades of 
American life. In 1877, clashes between workers and management of several major 
railroads exploded in veritable revolt, leading to massive property destruction and a 
                                                        
5 Melvyn Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1994) pgs. 6-7 
6 Major General O. O. Howard, “The Menace of Coxeyism,” The North Atlantic Review, June 
1894, Vol. 158 
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few dozen fatalities. In 1886, at a demonstration in the Haymarket section of 
Chicago organized in support of striking McCormick factory employees, a bomb 
attack left eight police officers dead and two purported radicals were hanged in 
retribution. The year 1892 was particularly bloody, witnessing industrial violence in 
the Coeur d’Alenes mining section of Idaho and in the steel mills of Homestead, 
Pennsylvania. In the last several decades of the nineteenth century, there were tens 
of thousands of work stoppages involving countless workers.  The trend of 
industrial violence, many feared, would be reignited with the massive 
unemployment resulting from the Depression of 1893, and the rank and file of the 
industrial armies appeared the most likely culprits. 
 But what distinguishes the Industrial Army Movement from the tumultuous 
violence of the era is its emphasis on law and order, sobriety and the outward image 
of respectability. The leaders of the movement, and the participants themselves, 
consciously presented the campaign as a collection of upright worker-citizens, 
deserving of a fair hearing from their Congressional leaders. The Industrial Army 
Movement of 1894 was therefore a watershed in late nineteenth century labor 
activism. Instead of the repeated local violence of workers attempting to control 
their worksites, this movement was non-violently oriented towards national 
political goals secured through democratic practices. The movement also 
symbolized the rejection by many workingmen of the “equal rights tradition,” which 
had prevailed for much of the preceding century. This ideology held that the federal 
government’s role in the economy should be equal application of the law and the 
removal of the privileged position of the wealthy from the republic process. In short, 
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the Industrial Army Movement marked a crucial transition within American labor 
activism whereby wage-earning industrial laborers sought to appropriate federal 
authority to direct the national economy towards the aims of the working class. 
Origins and Visions of the Movement 
The industrialization of the United States challenged nineteenth century 
conceptions of labor and citizenship. Much of American thought and activity during 
this period was influenced by the free labor ideology, which held that productive 
labor be rewarded with the means of subsistence and social mobility. This ideal was 
one of the bases of Jeffersonian Republicanism and the political ethos of Abraham 
Lincoln. The free labor ideology was cogently presented by Lincoln when he stated, 
“Inasmuch as most good things are produced by labor, it follows that all such things 
of right belong to those whose labor has produced them… To secure to each laborer 
the whole product of his labor… is a worthy object of any good government.”7 This 
ideology also rested on a belief that republican government depended on a public of 
independent citizens, in which a worker “owned his own toil,” and that each man 
was the full beneficiary of his productive endeavors. These tenets of the free labor 
society shaped the attitudes and aspirations of millions of working Americans in the 
pre-industrial U.S. 8 
 The industrial process fundamentally altered the reality that the free labor 
ideology played in the daily lives of American workers. As laborers moved from the 
fields to factories in major cities, they became incorporated into a world of wages 
                                                        
7 Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and The Men Who Made It (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1989) pg. 136 
8 Daniel T. Rodgers, The Work Ethic in Industrial America 1850-1920 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1979) pg. 30 
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and discipline.9 While laborers previously enjoyed a degree of autonomy over their 
work, industrial wage labor undermined this independent producer ideal, 
introducing a new system of worker subservience, dictated by the prerogatives of 
management and an impersonal wage market. Wage compensation problematized 
the expectation that work secured upward mobility, independent production and, in 
economic downturns, even basic subsistence. Industrial wage work, or “wage 
slavery” as many labor agitators termed it, increasingly cast the free labor ideology 
of the preceding century as a romantic myth. 
 As labor struggled to maintain the free labor ideology of the nineteenth 
century, collective efforts of workers operated within a corresponding “equal rights 
tradition.” This ideology held that working class demands could be won through 
marshalling workers’ political and civil rights and that proper ordering of political 
and market structures would alleviate labor’s plight. This tradition treated 
government intervention in the economy and labor mobilization into party politics 
with ambivalence, and at times, rejection. This orientation of labor activism abided 
by a faith that workers control of extra-political spheres of life would create a just 
society, as the promise of free labor would rectify economic wrongs. The equal 
rights tradition of the beginning half of the nineteenth century is exemplified by the 
Working Men’s movement in major cities throughout the 1830s, with their 
dedication to “loco foco,” removing “aristocracy” from government and granting 
increased control to workers over their worksites. However, the “workies,” as they 
were called, and the Workingmen’s Parties of the era “offered little in terms of 
                                                        
9 Herbert G. Gutman, Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America (New York, First 
Vintage Books, 1977) pgs. 49- 54  
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practical reform remedies,” or legislative goals to abet wage-earners’ concerns.10 11 
The equal rights tradition evolved with the inauguration of the Noble Order of the 
Knights of Labor in 1869. With the Knights’ “First Principles,” established in 1872, 
labor began articulating a vision for public authority to regulate work hours, child 
labor, to collect statistics through bureaus of labor and other reforms.12 But still, the 
Knights eschewed party politics and held government action to a regulatory role 
rather than a proactive agent in the wage market.13 The equal rights tradition is 
seen once again towards the end of the nineteenth century in the distrust of Samuel 
Gompers and his American Federation of Labor towards worker political 
mobilization and state power generally.14 As nineteenth century workers held onto 
the free labor ideology, working class political activism did not yet adopt the 
objectives of what sociologist T.H. Marshall called “social rights,” or a politically 
guaranteed minimum standard of living facilitated by government intervention in 
the wage market.15  
 Another defining aspect of nineteenth century labor activism was its frequent 
descent into bloodshed. As the above-mentioned instances of labor violence 
indicate, workers during the Gilded Age fought vigorously with management for 
                                                        
10 Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy; Jefferson to Lincoln (New and London: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2005) pgs. 413- 423 
11 Chester McArthur Destler, American Radicalism; 1865- 1901(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 
1946) ch. 1 
12 Sean Dennis Cashman, American in the Gilded Age; From the Death of Lincoln to the Rise of 
Theodore Roosevelt (New York and London: New York University Press, 1984) pg. 250 
13 Leon Fink, “The New Labor History and the Powers of Historical Pessimism: Hegemony, 
Consensus, Hegemony, and the case of the Knights of Labor,” The Journal of American 
History Vol. 75, (June 1988) pg. 119 
14 Theda Skocpol, Social Policy in the United States; Future Possibilities in Historical 
Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) pg. 111 
15 T.H. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class,” in The Citizenship Debate; A Reader, ed., 
Gershon Shafir (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) ch. 6 
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control of their productive lives. These often-violent contests unfolded in localized 
settings, involving conflicts of village or community autonomy against managers’ 
dictates to workers.16 Congruent with the equal rights tradition, workers believed 
that their vision for a just society relied not so much on control of governmental 
policy but of the industrial process itself.17 Leading into the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, the locus of conflict between management and labor was not so 
much Congress or the ballot box as it was the confines of the factory gate.   
 By the 1890s, industrialization had strained working class commitment to 
the equal rights tradition. Sentiments aired in the labor press reveal the 
inadequacies of political and civil rights in rectifying the plight of the working class. 
Various writers in the American Federationist, the publication of the anti-statist 
A.F.L., conveyed that the basic legal and political institutions of the republic were 
corrupted by the wealthy. One author used a story about several university students 
who blew up a basement and received lenient sentences to demonstrate the control 
of the judicial system by the “privileged class.” The author intended to “put to blush 
the men who declare that labor is wrong in believing that the constitutional 
guarantee of ‘equality before the law’ is fast becoming untrue, a mockery and an 
illusion.”18 In a poem written for the same journal, T.C. Walsh derided the purported 
                                                        
16 Gutman, ch. 5, also see description of struggles for community autonomy in Homestead 
(Linda Schneider, “The Citizen Striker: Workers’ Ideology in the Homestead Strike of 1892,” 
Labor History (The Tamiment Institute New York) 2001) as well as Marcus, Bullard and Moore 
(Irwin M. Marcus, Jennie Bullard, Rob Moore, “Change and Continuity: Steel Workers in 
Homestead, Pennsylvania, 1889-1895,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and 
Biography, The Historical Society of Pennsylvania Vol. 111 (January, 1987))  
17 David Montgomery, Beyond Equality; Labor and the Radical Republicans, 1862- 1872 (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967) pg. 142 
18 “Equality Before the Law,” American Federationist Vol. I (May 1894) 
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equality of American citizenship. In one verse of the piece, titled “Equality,” Walsh 
writes, 
“All men equal! Is it a jest? 
What! The oppressor equal of the oppressed? 
He whose palace doth pierce the skies, 
And he who at night by the roadside lies 
The demon of hunger knawing his breast –  
These men equal? Is it a jest?” 
The poet goes on to lament that while “justice away from the poor is sold… the poor 
won’t unite for their rights to sue.”19 These fragments convey a changing mentality 
within 1890s labor activism. The rights of the American worker in the courthouse 
and ballot box were increasingly deemed ineffective as the wealthy and powerful 
usurped these core institutions of American democracy. New strategies would have 
to be tried to achieve the demands of the labor movement. 
Indeed, to most working class Americans it seemed obvious that 
management increasingly harnessed political power. Beginning in 1877, when 
President Rutherford B. Hayes sent federal troops to uphold order on the railroads 
of West Virginia, the resources and manpower of state militias were utilized for the 
benefit of corporations. In 1892, with labor conflicts arising in the Coeur d’Alenes 
and Homestead, state and federal forces were ultimately called in to maintain 
production and effectively end workers’ means of securing their demands. Unions 
also had the additional obstacle of court injunctions, which frequently deemed work 
stoppages and other union tactics as “conspiracy,” necessitating state repression of 
labor activism. Increasingly throughout the era, the labor movement struggled as 
management called upon state and federal forces, as well as private security firms 
                                                        
19 T.C. Walsh, “Equality,” American Federationist Vol. 1 (March 1894) pg. 1 
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such as the Pinkerton Detective Agency, to quell worker agitation. The ability of 
managers to utilize state authority jolted the labor movement and demonstrated the 
outdated nature of the equal rights tradition. Especially after Homestead and, 
crucially, the Pullman Strike of 1894, workers in many parts of the country lost faith 
in equality before the law as the safeguard to economic liberty. By century’s end, 
labor adopted a national, political approach, often committed to “class struggle,” as 
is seen in the rise of the Socialist Party and the political career of Eugene V. Debs.20  
These developments highlighted the necessity of political solutions for those 
marginalized by industrialization. In the countryside, as agriculture became 
incorporated into industrial capitalism, a political insurgency took shape in the 
Populist Movement. Farmers all over the U.S., especially the Mid West and South, 
sought political solutions to growing corporate power of banks and railroads as the 
nineteenth century ideal of independent land ownership became a distant reality for 
many.21 Populists viewed their effort as a political revolt to uphold “pre-industrial 
republicanism… which linked freedom and independence with control over 
productive resources and portrayed the state as defender of the public good.”22 As 
displayed in the Omaha Platform of the People’s Party Convention in 1892, Populists 
called for the increased use of federal authority to curb excessive business power 
and uphold the interests of laborers and farmers. In this sense, the Populists were a 
                                                        
20 Marcus, Bullard, Moore, pgs. 61-75 
21 Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment; A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in 
America (London and New York: Oxford University Press Oxford, 1978) also see Steve Hahn, 
The Roots of Southern Populism; Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the Georgia 
Upcountry, 1850-1890 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) ch. 6 
22 Steve Hahn, pgs. 2-3 
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crucial voice for reclaiming nineteenth century free labor ideology and served as a 
precedent for the aims of the Industrial Army Movement. 
 Industrial workers, like farmers, were also becoming aware of the need for 
political solutions to the social conditions of the Gilded Age. And like their Populist 
brethren, “an eighteenth century republican political inheritance still provided the 
basic vocabulary” for their protest. 23 However, working class political agitation 
throughout the 1880s focused on local rather than federal power, demonstrated by 
the municipal victories of the Knights of Labor and its political party manifestations. 
As historian David Montgomery argues, much of nineteenth century labor activism 
was based on the equal rights tradition, maintaining that proper structuring of a 
free labor wage market could correct social ills, while providing a limited role for 
state intervention.24 However, by the 1880s many industrial communities had been 
won over by labor-based political parties. While in power, these workingmen’s 
parties wielded political instruments to address the concerns of their working-class 
constituents, including limited use of police force during strikes, eight hour days for 
municipal employees and, crucially, public employment during economic 
downturns. The experience of workingmen’s parties throughout the 1880s provided 
another precedent for the non-violent, politically-oriented activism seen in the 
Industrial Army Movement.   
 The crucial step that Coxey’s Army and the Commonweal took was moving 
the political demands from the municipality to the national center of authority. 
                                                        
23 Leon Fink, Workingmen’s Democracy; The Knights of Labor and American Politics (Urbana 
and Chicago: The University of Illinois Press, 1985) ch. 1-3 
24 David Montgomery, ch. 4 
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Observing the industrial armies in 1894, Thorstein Veblen concluded the movement 
represented working-class recognition of its “vital economic relation to the general 
[federal] government and through the general government to all the rest of the 
community, without intermediary of any lower or local body.”25 Furthermore, 
industrial wage work and the Depression of 1893 painfully demonstrated “that the 
availability of jobs was not determined locally, but, rather, that jobs were created 
through a national mechanism… the self-regulating market created by railways and 
industrialization.”26 Along with national unemployment, jobless workers all over the 
U.S. struggled with the paltry poor relief provided by municipalities that barely, if at 
all, covered their living expenses.27 28 Thus, moving beyond the limited resources of 
local government, the industrial armies headed towards Congress, the locus of 
national sovereignty. Significantly, the Industrial Army Movement was the first 
march on Washington in the nation’s history, making it a symbolic demonstration of 
the shift in working class activism moving from local to nationwide political plains.29 
 The social transformations of industrialization, and the political currents 
they motivated are the deep-rooted origins of the Industrial Army Movement. This, 
however, is lost in the existing historiography of the movement, which focuses on 
the political acumen of its leaders, notably Jacob Shechler Coxey, and generally 
                                                        
25 Thorstein B. Veblen, “The Army of the Commonweal,” Journal of Political Economy Vol. II 
(June 1894) pg. 456- 61 
26 Anne Mayhew, “Polanyi’s Double Movement and Veblen on the Army of the 
Commonweal,” Journal of Economic Issues Vol. 23 (June 1898) pg. 559 
27 McMurry, pg. 10 
28 “Work Not Charity,” American Federationist Vol. 4 (June 1894) 
29 Carlos Schwantes, Coxey’s Army; An American Odyssey (Lincoln and London: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1985) pg. 270 
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refers to the movement as simply “Coxey’s Army.” 30 This title fails to appreciate the 
vast social forces that motivated thousands of jobless workers to partake in the 
movement. Political and other developments of the last decade of the nineteenth 
century animated these men, fueled by a belief in the capacity for republican 
government and proper utilization of federal power to create a more just industrial 
process. 
 Jacob Coxey did play an important role, albeit a singular one. Originally from 
Massillon, Ohio, he conceptualized the movement several years before it occurred. 
In 1891, he wrote an original draft of his “Good Roads Bill,” calling for the Secretary 
of War to appropriate half a million dollars for an army of laborers, hired at $1.50 
for an eight-hour day, to build roads across the country. Shortly after, he formed the 
J.S. Coxey Good Roads Association and allied himself with professional labor activist 
Carl Browne of California. Over the next several years, the two worked together to 
gain recognition in political, labor and media circles.  The Depression of 1893 
created the conditions for Coxey and Browne to launch a “petition in boots,” and 
manifest their political ideas as a social movement. Beginning in March of 1894, 
Coxey sent out word of his proposed demonstration on Washington, in which the 
signatures in favor of his good roads bill would be represented by actual 
unemployed workingmen standing before the Capitol. Coxey’s message spread 
                                                        
30 This is demonstrated not only in the popular reference to the movement as “Coxey’s 
Army,” but also in the fact that the two major “biographies” of the movement are both called 
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Donald L. McMurry, Coxey’s Army; A Study of the Industrial Army Movement of 1894 (Seattle 
London: University of Washington Press, 1929)  
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nationwide and nearly a dozen industrial armies across the country formed, vowing 
to meet Coxey and his men May 1st in Washington D.C. By April of 1894, the 
Industrial Army Movement was in full swing, becoming a subject of constant media 
attention and national scrutiny. 
 The weakness in the argument that Coxey was the most powerful, 
inspirational leader of the movement is best demonstrated by the fact that the 
majority of participants came not out of Massillon but from the West Coast of the 
United States. Beginning in autumn of 1893, unemployed wage workers all over the 
Pacific Rim organized into bands in order to gain free rides upon railways. These 
nascent industrial armies formed independently of Coxey’s activism in Ohio and the 
mobilization of unemployed workingmen is solidly of western origins.31 Throughout 
the first half of 1894, at least seven different industrial armies of unemployed 
workers set out from Los Angeles, San Francisco, Tacoma, Seattle, Butte, Portland 
and Great Falls. The unique industrial development of the West, and its political 
history, demonstrate how the industrial armies formed and the overemphasis given 
to Coxey in their formation. 
 The immense influence of federal government power in the history of the 
American West bred fertile ground for the national political demands of the 
Industrial Army Movement. National government authority was the basis for Anglo-
American settlement, first in driving off native peoples from their lands, and then in 
building the railroads, dams, reservoirs and canals necessary for modern 
development in its arid areas. Additionally, the national government had long been a 
                                                        
31 McMurry, pg. 15- 20 
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large owner of public land in the West. Patricia Limerick describes the West as “a 
particularly illuminating case study in state power,” where “the operations of the 
federal government are crucial and central.” The economic development of the 
West, heavily prone to volatile booms and busts, had also been tempered by federal 
intervention.32 The heavy-handed role played by the national government in 
American settlement of the West made its citizens more ready to use federal power 
in addressing the social ills wrought by Depression. 
 Another condition unique to workers in the West is what historian Carlos 
Schwantes calls “the ideology of disinheritance.” Related to the free labor ideology, 
this idea conveys the sense of disillusionment that many unskilled, industrial 
workers of the West felt as the promise of upward mobility and individual success 
were stymied by low wages, corporate control of production and loss of 
independent producer status. The ideology was most often framed in republican 
values and was directed simultaneously at corporate power, corrupt government 
and cheap Chinese labor. The frustrations of Western workers – often laboring in 
some of the deadliest industries such as lumberjacking, mining and railroad 
construction – led to their mobilization into labor and political groups operating on 
the local level. In the 1880s, radical worker activity was generally channeled 
through Knights of Labor affiliates and the International Workingmen’s Association, 
which educated workers in the relationship between economic and political power. 
The best demonstration of these lessons took form in the actual mobilization of 
state and federal authority in cracking down on these radical labor groups. For 
                                                        
32 Patricia Limerick, Something in the Soil; Legacies and Reckonings in the New West (New 
York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000) pgs. 23-26 
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example, after vigilante squads attempted to expurgate Chinese laborers from 
Tacoma, Washington, federal authorities quelled the operation under the authority 
of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.  While this act of “frontier vigilantism” was a 
particularly untoward instance of labor mobilization, it nevertheless demonstrated 
Western worker radicalism, its highly political nature and its confrontation with 
federal authority.33  
 The nature of Western workers themselves made them easy recruits for the 
Industrial Army Movement once the Depression of 1893 devastated the West. 
Frontier ideals of individual success frustrated “wage slavery” made for a highly 
transient labor force easily mobilized for radical activism. The industries peculiar to 
the West, where workers often lived in isolated camps and were frequently treated 
as “human machines” in labor-intensive work, pitted laborers at odds with wage 
compensation and management discipline. Western workers frequently protested 
with their feet, evident in the fact that the average duration for work in Western 
industry in 1914 was fifteen to thirty days in lumberjacking, sixty days in mining, 
thirty days in canning, ten days in construction and only seven days in harvesting.34 
Even had workers chosen to abide by management discipline, employment was not 
steady and subject to intense drifts in market activity. The transient nature of work 
in the West abetted the development of a particular lifestyle, sometimes called 
“hobo” but certainly similar to the “tramp” title frequently given to the Industrial 
                                                        
33 Carlos A. Schwantes, “Protest in a Promised Land: Unemployment, Disinheritance, and the 
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Army rank and file. This lifestyle entailed stealing rides aboard railroads, wandering 
from town to town in search of temporary employment. By the 1890s, there were 
somewhere between forty to sixty thousand tramps throughout the U.S.35 In short, 
the nature of work and life in the industrializing West made ready recruits for the 
Industrial Army Movement as the Depression of 1893 swelled the ranks of jobless, 
migratory workingmen.   
 What motivated these Western workers to organize this campaign across the 
country, which had always carried tenuous hope of success, has hardly been settled 
by historians. Yet the proclamations of the marchers themselves reveal plenty. Some 
interpret Western radicalism exemplifying a class struggle between management of 
frontier industries and workers organized in the large, industrial unions such as the 
Western Federation of Minors, the Western Labor Union and later the Industrial 
Workers of the World.36 Others see a “peculiar vision of millennial harmony” in the 
Industrial Army’s demands, predicated on simple notions of economic redemption 
that would allow “Americans [to] literally purchase their way into utopia.”37 Class 
struggle and, even less so, religious fervor played marginal roles in what was 
ultimately a political movement. Rather, the constitutions drafted by the industrial 
armies themselves reveal a republican faith that good government ought to uphold 
the rights and interest of the industrial, wage-earning class. Marching out of Los 
Angeles in February 1894, under the leadership of Lewis C. Fry, Fry’s Army drafted a 
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constitution that reflected the class-consciousness of its authors while adorning 
their demands in the republican rhetoric that was common to the era. The Preamble 
states that  
 We… As patriotic, American citizens, have organized ourselves into an Industrial 
Army, for the purpose of centralizing all unemployed Americans at the seat of 
Government (Washington D.C.) and tender our services to feed, clothe and shelter 
the Nation’s needy, and to accomplish this end we make the following demands on 
the government: 
 1st Government employment for all her unemployed citizens 
 2d. Prohibition of foreign immigration for ten years 
 3d. That no alien be allowed to own real estate in the United States 
  
The Constitution had additionally asked, “Why is it that those who produce food are 
hungry? Why is it that those who make clothes are ragged?” In essence, this 
industrial army constitution framed the class grievances of small farmers and 
industrial laborers in the rhetoric of republican rights, demanding protections for 
these groups through the authority of the national government.  
 One such marcher in Fry’s Army was Bernard Baes. Originally from Belgium, 
Baes had traveled extensively, like many Western migrant laborers, living in 
Wisconsin before settling in Chicago and somehow making his way to Los Angeles to 
take part in Fry’s Army. He had worked as a coachman and was a scrupulous 
employee, earning letters of recommendation from employers as “sober and 
trustworthy.” Baes became the Secretary of Fry’s Army and his roster of marchers 
reveal the industrial, wage-earning status of nearly all the participants, who 
represented over a dozen states and several nationalities. It was likely not religious, 
utopian visions that motivated Baes, as one letter addressed to him in 1894 reveals 
the author’s grief that he had “forsaken his religion.” The evidence suggest, rather, 
that Baes like many of the other unemployed workingmen of Fry’s Army protested 
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the economic plight of those who had earned their keep – being “active, industrious, 
willing and trustworthy” as another employer described Baes – and yet were jobless 
victims of the Depression of 1893.38  
 The ambitious proposals of Fry’s Army were matched by the other large 
contingents. Beyond his Good Roads Bills - which were introduced to Congress 
throughout the 1890s but never close to passing - Coxey had a vision of widespread 
federal authority being used to develop all municipalities across the country. As 
reported by Henry Vincent, a journalist who followed Coxey’s Army and became its 
official biographer, Coxey wanted federal money to pour into every town to build 
schools, courthouses, infirmaries, libraries and every conceivable public service. 
This “system of public improvements,” paid for with non-interest bearing bonds, 
would “settle the money question” since it would substitute a cash system for a 
credit or script system.39 Elite opinion disdained the idea of government issuing fiat 
money to be spent by any small town governments for projects it believed would 
benefit its citizens. Secretary of Agriculture J. Sterling Morton described the idea as a 
theory derived by “vagrant economists,” and stated, “No one, with good reasoning 
faculties, can even attempt to defend an inconvertible currency.”40 The cabinet 
2member did not approve of Coxey’s scheme, but the Ohioan’s followers marched to 
Washington to see such a program implemented. 
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 Charles Kelley, leading an industrial army out of San Francisco, fashioned a 
unique program that combined a federal jobs program with the Western tradition of 
homesteading. Under his scheme, unemployed workers would be hired by the state 
for three years to build irrigation systems to open new lands for cultivation, and 
after three years buy the converted plots. This plan, as Kelley put it, would turn 
“homeless wanderers into steady farmers and property owners.”41 The idea 
revealed the lingering faith in the free labor ideology of private ownership of land 
and production, while it based its future success on federal government investment.  
 In addition to the Western and Coxey’s Army, contingents formed from the 
long-industrialized Northeast and New England. An industrial army was created in 
Boston and led by Morrison Swift who, unlike most industrial workers, had been 
educated at Williams College and in Germany before becoming a labor agitator. 
Swift’s political vision was statist and was known in the Boston press as a socialist 
agitator. The Boston group eventually met up in New York with armies from 
Connecticut and Rhode Island and drafted a similar petition to that of Fry’s Army. 
Their constitution called for widespread federal government intervention, including 
the provision of farms and factories to all parts of the country where there was 
unemployment, the nationalization of all railroads, a federal commission to 
investigate whether all trusts should be nationalized and an amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution that would “affirm the right of everyone to have work.”42 Like the 
demands of the Western armies, this document framed class-based grievances in 
republican language, seeking rectification in federal government authority and the 
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Constitution. The Western and Eastern armies conveyed different visions, the 
former based more in recreating the romantic promise of prosperity in the West 
while the latter bent more towards overtly socialist ideology. Yet the two 
movements of unemployed laborers fit into the same movement, not just in their 
journey for political vindication of their grievances, but in the common sense of 
vulnerability that wage-earners all over the U.S. felt and experienced during the 
Depression. Also in common was that by April of 1894, all the armies from over a 
dozen locations throughout the U.S. were headed toward Washington D.C. to 
demand Congress aid American workers. 
A Respectable Movement 
 As the procession unfolded a deluge of condescension, scorn and general ill-
will poured out from the media, politicians and others who were likely not directly 
affected by the Depression and widespread unemployment. Criticism of the 
movement generally took two, and at times contradictory forms. One strain saw the 
Industrial Armies as farcical, composed of feeble-minded and easily exploited 
tramps who were not to be taken seriously. This argumentation also viewed the 
movement as an anti-democratic force that was imposing its will through 
intimidation upon the nation’s legislatures rather than through legitimate change 
achieved through the ballot box. One reporter of The Chautauquan saw “the rank 
and file of the Coxey army” as men who “have no settled place of residence and no 
visible means of support, liable to arrest and vagrancy… commonly called tramps.” 
The reporter stated frankly, “These movements have their farcical side and in part 
are not to be taken seriously;” rather they were an unsavory response to the poor 
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market conditions, but would not ultimately impede “the march of civilization” and 
the “measured trend of social progress.”43 Thomas Byrne, Superintendent of the 
New York Police Department concurred. “These idle, useless dregs of humanity – too 
lazy to work, too miserably inefficient to earn a living,” in Byrne’s opinion, sought to 
provoke reform not through the “legitimate way, by securing enough votes to elect 
their representatives,” but through intimidation of the U.S. Congress. Like the 
aforementioned reporter, Byrne viewed the Industrial Armies “with somewhat the 
same feeling of amusement with which we watch the horse-play of the clown in the 
circus ring.”44 Removed from the social devastation experienced by industrial wage-
earners during the Depression, middle class opinion saw the movement as a 
collection of the least desirable citizens of the nation, shirking responsible 
employment in order to engage in anti-republican political antics.  
Others viewed the industrial armies as not just a menace but also a danger to 
public health. Dr. Alvah H. Doty, the chief of the Bureau of the Contagious Diseases 
with the New York Board of Health, worried greatly about the “hygiene and 
cleanliness” of the mobilized unemployed marchers. Dr. Doty forewarned that it was 
“easy to understand that as a means of increasing contagious diseases throughout 
the country, Coxeyism is an agent of the most vicious type.”45 The New York 
bureaucrat combined a middle class skepticism of the moral character of the 
marchers – arguing that the “great majority of them would take part in any 
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movement which would insure them plenty of food and drink and protection from 
work” – with a contemporary bourgeois obsession with public health and 
cleanliness.   
 Accompanying this elite disdain was the specter of industrial violence so 
common to the Gilded Age. Critics also decried the movement with expectations of 
property destruction, violent mobilization of workers and bloodshed. The reporter 
for The Chautauquan believed that the movement’s roots lay in the lax treatment 
given towards the Haymarket rioters, which gave “official encouragement to the 
common enemies of society.” Superintendent Byrne asked if these armies did not 
constitute “threatened civil war” and expected that once the leaders of the 
movement deserted their followers in Washington D.C. blood would run through the 
nation’s capitol. This illegal movement, he argued, ought to have been stopped 
before it had reached Washington, just as the “Great Rebellion of 1861” had been. 
Although these fears were exaggerated, and time would prove inaccurate, they were 
based upon common perceptions of a particular social strata observing American 
society in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Many elites saw the era’s 
industrial unrest as the result of unrealistic political and economic expectations of 
native-born factory workers and the political radicalism carried over from Europe 
by the mass of new, immigrant laborers.46  
 One who shared these fears was the sitting President. Grover Cleveland 
began his political ascendency as a reform Democrat in the patently corrupt scene of 
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post-Civil War New York State politics. Many hoped that Cleveland could alter the 
social ills of the 1880s and 1890s, but his two terms in office proved conservative. 
He surrounded himself with officials coming largely from the business 
establishment, such as Attorney General Richard Olney, a leading railroad lawyer, 
Secretary of War Daniel S. Lamont, from the Continental National Bank of New York, 
and his advisors Daniel Manning and William C. Whitney. Even before the 
Depression of 1893, Whitney had written to Cleveland that “…the impression of you 
got by the people is that you do not appreciate their suffering and poverty … and 
have your ideas informed by Eastern money power, etc. – the usual twaddle….” 
Cleveland applied an austere approach to governance, rejecting federal support of 
social insurance programs and tariffs for American manufacturing. But his 
commitment to laissez faire ideology dissuaded him from federal initiatives to 
alleviate working class and Populist grievances, rejecting bi-metallism and 
maintaining parsimonious government spending after the onset of the Depression of 
1893.47 The President’s conservatism made him wary of reports coming in of 
unemployed workers throughout the United States organizing and heading towards 
Washington, sending federal agents to tail Coxey’s Army as it organized in Ohio. The 
Secretary of the Treasury sent a Secret Service unit to infiltrate Coxey’s men, as did 
the Chief of the Pittsburgh Police. 48 49 The District of Columbia militia drilled and 
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prepared for a possible invasion of the capitol.50 While federal agents were 
mobilized to counter the first signs of unruliness from the industrial armies, police 
headquarters in dozens of municipalities were similarly put on high alert.  
 But observers who actually communicated with the men in the industrial 
armies gathered very different conclusions. A. Cleveland Hall, an academic at Johns 
Hopkins University, met up with the Coxey contingent in Rockville, Maryland and 
believed the men he interviewed to be genuine, jobless laborers who were marching 
out of belief and necessity. “These men are not tramps, but for the most part 
unskilled, uneducated workmen; men just above the tramp class, who are the first to 
suffer during times of Depression and the last to regain employment.” Additionally, 
the marchers strove to avoid offers of charity and traveled as “an army of peace, 
resolved to obey the laws even when they considered them unjust.” Hall also 
believed that the movement had an educational effect on its participants, forcing 
them to engage in serious thought of political and economic issues, though, to the 
author’s regret, often leading their sympathies toward socialism.51  
 A. Cleveland Hall’s illustration of the army from Massillon is consistent with a 
survey of Kelley’s Army coming out of San Francisco. While marching through Iowa, 
President Aylesworth of Drake University questioned seven hundred sixty-three 
men, out which four hundred twenty-five named eighty-three different trades they 
had previously worked in, the most common being miner. The investigation also 
showed that over two thirds of Kelley’s Army were native born Americans, and out 
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of the foreign born portion most had come from England or Germany (though there 
were workers from Poland, Russia, Greece Turkey and Argentina counted). 
Politically, two hundred-forty who responded stated they were Populists, two 
hundred-eighteen were Republican, and one hundred ninety-six were Democrat and 
only eleven independents. That over fifteen percent claimed to have no religion at 
all suggests interpretations of the industrial armies as a religiously-inspired 
movement are misguided. An interviewer from the Iowa State Register found that 
from a sample of twenty five men, six claimed they would return to work only for 
“union” or “standard” wages, while twelve named wages ranging from one to two 
dollars a day, and seven claimed they “were willing do to any work offered.”52 The 
insider reports from the various contingents reveal that the movement was hardly 
composed of deadbeats, but instead wage-earning industrial laborers made 
vulnerable to penury by market downturns.  
Fears of unemployed workers unleashing violent class warfare were 
ultimately proved false. The participants and the leaders of the industrial armies 
consciously fashioned a movement that was orderly, non-violent, respectful of 
private property and congruent with middle class norms of behavior. However, they 
did not adopt bourgeois standards of conduct but were, rather, demonstrating a 
tradition of working class respectability rooted in skilled craft union norms. As the 
various contingents marched to the capitol, they presented themselves as a 
disciplined force of workers actively disavowing the stigma of industrial violence 
that had made national headlines over the past decades. By doing so, they hoped to 
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present themselves before the republic’s leaders as dignified worker-citizens, 
worthy of federal aid. 
 Carlos Schwantes asserts that the Commonweal demonstrated “Spartan 
vigor” in its procession towards Washington.53 Indeed, each of the armies took 
special efforts to ensure the image of the movement would not be tarnished by 
rowdiness or seemingly indecent behavior. At the outset in Massillon, Coxey and 
Browne vetted the original recruits, accepting only those who appeared out-of-work 
laborers and rejecting those perceived to be beggars. The leaders also disqualified 
foreign workers because of their popular association with European radicalism.54 
Daily routines were regimented by Coxey and Browne including daily shaving of 
beards and having the men drill and exercise. The press was deliberately given 
access to the armies when they were grooming to demonstrate the men’s dedication 
to hygiene.55 When arriving in different towns, Coxey’s Army would surprise local 
law enforcement with their discipline and compliance with police demands. In the 
march from Massillon to Washington, there were no arrests made.56 
 The contingent from Los Angeles demonstrated similar efforts to maintain 
order, sobriety and respectability. Members of Fry’s Army were also vetted and had 
to sign an oath stating,  
“I have sworn to support the constitution of the United States and the Industrial 
Army. To obey all orders that may be said, sent, or handed to me by those 
authorized to do so… To never violate any law of the United States or such state or 
territory in which I may be, or aid or abet any riotous conduct. To respect the right 
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of property and law and order. To never act in any manner to bring discredit upon 
the Industrial Army or the United States.”57   
 
Like the other armies, Fry’s Army won over cities with their discipline and integrity. 
The men also complied with middle class standards of hygiene and public health, 
such as in Terre Haute, Indiana, where despite some of the recruits’ resistance the 
army was vaccinated in accordance with the laws of the state. One reporter stated 
that the marchers had impressed the city reporters “by the excellent camp discipline 
observed and by the cleanliness and intelligent appearance of the men.”58 
 Working class respectability was the prerogative of both the leaders of each 
army and the democratic will of the participants themselves. With only scarce 
exceptions, the marchers upheld law and order while the leaders facilitated the 
image of respectability to host communities and the media. Charles Kelley, leading 
unemployed men out of San Francisco, faced difficulties in controlling some of his 
West Coast contingent. Kelley also filtered recruits, accepting only one hundred fifty 
men out of many hundreds in Council Bluffs, Iowa and the men took a similar oath 
as Fry’s Army.59 In an effort to maintain the purity of his ranks, General Kelley kept 
tabs on the men by giving them membership cards and insignia, which they were 
required to show before going to sleep.60 Like Fry’s Army in Omaha, Kelley’s Army 
arrived in Ogden, Utah to skeptical locals only to win local sympathy through 
discipline, a prayer service and appeals to local railroad workers’ antagonism to 
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railroad managers.61 However, maintaining discipline over the nationwide journey 
proved tasking, sometimes requiring punitive discipline. In Iowa, after traveling 
halfway across the continental U.S., General Kelley kicked out a ranking member for 
public drunkenness.  
 Such measures were necessary for the survival of a movement that was 
always viewed with deep suspicion and even fear from elite circles. Yet, these 
measures, and the fundamental character of the Industrial Army Movement were 
rooted in labor activist and Populist traditions of the late nineteenth century. The 
strands linking the industrial armies with Knights of Labor activism is highlighted in 
the alcohol policy of both political currents.  
Craft unions had long advocated temperance as a means to improve the lot of 
workers. Rather than adopting middle class perspectives of sobriety and 
domesticity, “temperance radicalism” was a working class initiative to repel 
management control of working class culture and inculcate a sense of dignity in 
workers, who it was hoped would demand greater control of industrial society once 
abstaining from drink.62 Accordingly, the Knights of Labor restricted liquor 
distributors from its ranks. Craft unions generally had strict rules against on-the-job 
and public drunkenness, especially in the more dangerous professions. For instance, 
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers took a number of steps to promote 
sobriety among its members including hosting gatherings in dry lodges, refusing to 
pay insurance claims of members injured while intoxicated and frequently expelling 
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members for public drunkenness.63 Union discipline often pitted skilled members 
against unskilled workers in the same worksite and temperance was never fully 
instilled in the work and leisure habits of the latter group. Nevertheless, labor 
leaders took great strides to fashion an American working class imbued with self-
control to demand greater respect as laborers. Thus, Eugene Debs when Secretary-
Treasurer of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen praised the virtues of the 
sober worker, noting that “… if [the temperate man] grasps the throttle of an engine 
there will be no sleeping at that post… No drink touches his lips while he is making 
his run. Clear-brained, keen-eyed, strong armed he stands at his post… Duty does 
not call to him in vain.”64 
Another facet of late nineteenth century propriety that the industrial armies 
abided by was exclusion of women from political activity. For the most part, the 
industrial armies shunned women, especially the leaders who constantly thought of 
the image the movement presented to the media. Ambiguous female relations with 
marchers became an item of tabloid coverage when Coxey temporary allowed Edna 
Harper and Anna Hooten to accompany the army, even while they stayed in 
separate tents or hotels.65 The pair was sent home immediately upon stories 
appearing in the press of sexual relations between Coxey and Hooten.66 Rejection of 
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women was not just for the media’s sake, but most likely found sympathy among the 
industrial, male marchers.  
However, like labor activism generally in the period, the Industrial Army 
Movement presented a modicum of entrance into political activity for some women. 
Susan Levine argues that Knight of Labor’s union organizing opened avenues for 
women wageworkers to preach their own brand of labor protest, albeit one built 
around the language of domesticity.67 Similarly, Populism offered women larger 
space for political engagement.68 Similarly, women came up with their own 
arguments for why they should be able to participate in the Industrial Army 
Movement. Women auxiliaries were formed and aided the Western bodies on their 
journey eastward. One such auxiliary was formed in Chicago by Lucy Parsons, the 
wife of Haymarket Riot martyr and anarchist Albert Parsons. One woman, Anna 
Ferry Smith, was elected president of an industrial army marching out of Oakland, 
though it did not end up leaving California. There are also stories of women 
disguising themselves as men in order to take part in the Industrial Army 
Movement.69 The movement provided women with some refuge from the daily 
confinement to domesticity and a brief entrance into the world of radical political 
activism. 
The Industrial Army Movement exhibited working class respectability 
wherever they went. Any lapse in discipline could alarm authorities already 
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apprehensive of the “the commune” during the depths of the Depression of 1893 
and the misery it harbored. Indeed, the Industrial Armies lived with the daily reality 
of police obstructionism or, even worse, repression at the hands of state or federal 
militias. Discipline, for the most part, was maintained in order to complete the 
political project begun by the Knights of Labor and the Populist Party in the prior 
decades: to leave behind the equal rights tradition of the nineteenth century and 
create a more just industrial order using federal authority.  
Reclaiming the People’s Property 
From a different perspective, discipline was never maintained in the 
Industrial Army Movement. The most controversial legal terrain the movement 
trespassed was the issue of “train-stealing.” Unable to pay the thousands of dollars 
required to transport scores of unemployed workers from the West Coast to 
Washington D.C. the leaders and participants marched by foot and used trains 
wherever possible. When local or state governments were unwilling or incapable of 
paying the unemployed men’s railway fares, stealing a ride became a common 
solution. This was easy enough for many workers, especially in the West, where 
mobile laborers frequently “tramped” from city to city in search of temporary 
employment. Additionally, many of the industrial army rank and file were 
unemployed railroad workers themselves. Bernard Baes’s roster from Fry’s Army 
reveals several workers whose craft would be useful in steering a train, including a 
“train man,” railroad workers, engineers, machinists and a brakeman.70  
                                                        
70 Industrial Army of the United States. Papers. University of Washington Library Archives. 
Seattle 
 37
 A train-stealing incident in Montana led to one of the few fatalities of 
Industrial Army Movement. In April 1894, two hundred members of the Butte 
Miners’ Union, some with families facing starvation, organized a Montana industrial 
army and elected William Hogan as leader. Among the miners were several 
unemployed railroad workers, likely affected by the strike against the Northern 
Pacific that began that year. The men, determined to travel to Washington and join 
Coxey and the other armies, successfully absconded with railway cars and headed 
east. The Northern Pacific quickly won an injunction from Judge Hiram Knowles, 
prompting U.S. deputy marshals to pursue the stolen train and detain the men.71 
Hogan’s Army was stopped in Billings and while the unemployed workers were 
being arrested, one was fatally shot.72 
 The tragedy in Montana was a jarring lesson in federal power for the 
movement. It not only underlined the importance of discipline in the ranks but the 
crucial role political power played in labor activism. The Republican Governor of 
Montana, John E. Rickards, had taken an aloof stance once the Northern Pacific 
contacted him, which inadvertently led to heavy-handed federal repression. But in 
other instances, political power was yielded to the benefit of the industrial armies. 
In states where Populists leaders held executive office, unemployed marchers 
successfully stood up to railroad corporations. Populism served as a fundamental 
current pushing the armies towards Washington, both physically and ideologically. 
 In many ways, the Industrial Army Movement was a facet of Populism. 
Several of its major leaders, including Jacob Coxey, grew into political activism 
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through Populist agitation. But what united the two movements most was their 
commitment to gaining federal assistance for the “union of the labor forces” of the 
nation.73 The Omaha Platform illustrates the intersection between Populism and the 
industrial armies, such as the Land Plank – that land “should not be monopolized for 
speculative purposes, and alien ownership of land should be prohibited… and held 
for settlers only” – which was incorporated into the preamble of Fry’s Army’s 
Constitution. Additionally, the calls for free coinage of silver were integral to the 
visions of Coxey and especially the miners of Hogan’s Army. The Industrial Army 
Movement extended the demands of the Omaha Platform to include the grievances 
of the unemployed worker, demonstrated in General Kelley’s scheme of land 
reclamation. Demanding that the federal government hire jobless workers to build 
irrigation systems to open up new lands for settlement, Kelley combined the 
Populist ethos of republican citizen ownership of private homesteads with the 
political project of federal relief for unemployment. Of the rank and file, surveys of 
the different armies reveal high levels of Populist Party affiliation.  But even if the 
Industrial Army Movement did not originate as an official Populist endeavor, its 
procession to Washington solidified its commitment to and representation of the 
Populist revolt. 
 The Industrial Army Movement put the words of the People’s Party into 
action. While the Omaha Platform stated, “that the time has come when the railroad 
corporations will either own the people or the people must own the railroads,” it 
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was the train-stealing industrial armies that actually confronted corporate railroad 
power. Though train-stealing had ended tragically for Hogan’s Army, other 
contingents successfully pilfered rides with the aid of Populist Governors. Marching 
out from the desert in Southern California, the nearly one thousand men in Fry’s 
Army quickly became convinced that train transportation was necessary. Lewis Fry 
had himself been a mechanic for the Southern Pacific Railroad but was fired and 
blacklisted following a labor dispute. When the army arrived in Yuma, Arizona, Fry 
and his men tramped a Southern Pacific line carrying citrus fruit east, to the mild 
protest of the train’s crewmen. The train and its unwanted passengers travelled 
through Arizona, New Mexico and most of Texas, receiving hospitality from the 
cities in which they stopped. However, Southern Pacific management sought an 
immediate halt to the train, eventually receiving a court injunction ordering Texas 
Rangers to be dispatched to protect railroad property. Fry’s Army was subsequently 
stranded in the desert without food or water after the railroad refused access to its 
company tanks along the dry, barren, Texas country.74   
 The Southern Pacific had to obtain an injunction because of the unwillingness 
of Texas Governor James Hogg to cooperate with the company’s pleas to protect its 
property. Hogg was elected in 1890, running as a “reform Democrat,” with large 
support from the state’s agricultural sector. Though he would later prove a 
disappointment to the radical element of the Texas Populists, he was never a friend 
of the railroads, and had, in fact, built his political career upon the ire among Texan 
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farmers towards railway corporations. 75 Upon hearing the abandonment of Fry’s 
Army in the desert, Hogg decried the Southern Pacific;  
“When a railroad hauls tramps or unemployed penniless men into this state it 
cannot dump them into the barren desert and murder them by torture and 
starvation … Nor will I allow [Fry’s Army] to be shot down on Texas soil by an 
armed force whatsoever, no matter how much the Southern Pacific or other enemies 
of the state may howl about the Commune.”76 
 
Hogg expressed public sympathy for the unemployed army, demanding the railroad 
take the men eastward on their journey to Washington. Meanwhile, Fry’s Army, 
diminished to five hundred men, was languishing in the desert, surviving on two 
cows and five hundred pounds of flour. Hogg remained resolute and eventually the 
Southern Pacific caved, which ultimately brought the Army to the state capital in 
Austin. Fry and his men wanted to thank the Governor personally, but he refused. In 
an open letter to Coxey followers in Texas, Hogg wrote, “Of all chimerical schemes, 
unpatriotic steps or foolish freaks into which American citizens have ever been 
allured, this ‘National Tramp’ is the most pitiable and inexcusable.”77 It appears 
Governor Hogg was more interested in exploiting public sympathy for the Industrial 
Army Movement and enmity of the railroad companies in order to boost his image, 
rather than abetting the plight of unemployed workers. Upon hearing this response, 
the Industrial armies were likely just as disappointed with the moderation of the 
Hogg Administration as Texan Populists would eventually become. Nevertheless, his 
intransigent stand against the Southern Pacific demonstrated the potent force 
political authority could play when yielded to assist workers. It was similar political 
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force that the marchers ultimately hoped would be won once they had stood before 
Congress. 
 One of the largest obstacles facing the Industrial Army Movement were the 
myriad vagrancy laws adopted by many localities across the country. Participants 
and leaders at several points throughout the march were arrested on such charges, 
including General Fry in El Paso, Texas. Kelley’s Army faced a similar problem as it 
trained into Colorado. The Southern Pacific Railroad had again stranded an 
industrial army, this time in Ogden, Utah. Governor Caleb West, who was far less 
effective than Hogg in standing up to the railroad, initially complied with a Court 
injunction allowing him to use the militia to force Kelley’s Army eastward. However, 
the workingmen’s organizations in Ogden, a city with a large population of miners 
and railroad workers, raised funds to feed the army and sent the mayor of the city to 
convince the group to march east, which the army agreed to. The men then 
commandeered a Union Pacific train heading towards Colorado but Kelley and his 
men began to worry about one of the state’s stranger vagrancy laws, which fined a 
railroad $200 “for each pauper it brought into the state.” Kelley wired Populist 
Governor Davis Waite asking if the trainload of unemployed workers would be met 
by the state’s militia. Over his Administration, Governor Waite had been a reliable 
Populist, gaining the loyalty of the large number of miners in the state and 
introducing legislation to regulate the railroads.78 He replied to Kelley “any citizen of 
the United States has the right of passage through Colorado.” Speaking later to a 
crowd in Denver about Kelley’s Army he stated that “Their cause is just and they 
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should be aided…. Were I to call upon to order out the militia against them, I 
probably would do so, but it would be only as a commissary Department.”79 Similar 
to Governor Hogg, the ascendancy of Populist leaders such as Governor Waite into 
political office demonstrated how the machinery of government could aid workers 
and labor activism.  
 This lesson was only reinforced in Kansas, a state steeped in Populist 
tradition. Populist Governor Lorezno Lewellyn sent his personal assurance to an 
industrial army marching through the state that no state militias would impede 
their path. Governor Lewellyn had described the Industrial Army Movement as 
“more than a petition, it is an earnest and vigorous protest against the injustice and 
the tyranny of the age,” making personal donations for camp provisions for one 
industrial army. Lewellyn’s sympathy may have been personal as he had been a 
tramp in Chicago a few decades prior to Coxey’s Army. In Kansas, as in Colorado and 
Texas, a Populist Governor abetted the marchers, suspending vagrancy laws and 
giving private support to the movement.80  
 Prominent Populist leaders greeted the industrial armies in various cities. In 
Topeka, the People’s Party League greeted Kelley’s Army with food and provisions.81 
Also meeting up with the marchers in the Kansas capital was Mary Lease, who had 
famously urged Populist farmers to “raise less crops and more hell,” extending her 
rhetorical flare in support of the Industrial Army Movement. Lease excused the 
marchers’ train stealing, stating that “almost every railroad had stolen from the 
                                                        
79 Washington Star, April 24, 1894 
80 Schwantes, pgs. 199-201 
81 McMurry, pg. 161 
 43
people represented by the industrial armies, and thieves cannot expect sympathy if 
the owners recover stolen property.”82 Similarly, in Des Moines, Iowa, a People’s 
Party Political Club headed by the party’s 1892 Presidential candidate, James B. 
Weaver, organized a reception for Kelley’s Army when it arrived in the city. 
Throughout the marchers’ stay in Des Moines, the Populists acted as host and 
Weaver sought railroad transportation for their journey to Washington.83 
In addition to the Populist revolt, the other political current aiding the 
industrial armies towards Washington was organized labor, notably the Knights of 
Labor. As mentioned earlier, by the early 1890s, the Knights of Labor had moved 
into the political realm in the form of various workingmen’s parties, which while in 
power took measures to ease the plight of industrial wage-earners. The industrial 
armies were attempting to complete the political project undertaken by the 
workingmen’s parties, to harness federal authority to protect industrial 
wageworkers. When the marchers of the industrial armies travelled through many 
working-class cities local workingmen’s organizations exhibited a remarkable 
degree of labor solidarity. Even those still employed despite the Depression 
sympathized with their jobless counterparts and supported the political goals of the 
Industrial Army Movement. The Journal of the Knights of Labor stated that “While 
the Knights of Labor has not given official assistance to the Coxey movement, it has 
not discourage it, nor will it,” because the political goals of the Commonweal 
overlapped with the Knight’s Preamble and Constitution.84 Additionally, many of the 
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marchers themselves had worked in industries heavily organized by the Knights and 
other trade unions. A survey of the rank and file at the tail end of the Industrial 
Army Movement, by which time many participants had left, revealed no less than 
three hundred fifty-four Knights of Labor members.85   
Throughout the nation, areas with sizable working class populations were 
sympathetic to the movement.86 Generous welcomes greeted Coxey’s Army as it 
marched through the heavily industrialized Allegheny mountain range and 
surrounding areas. In New Liverpool, Ohio, over a hundred striking potters, many of 
them skilled German workers, extended a message of support to the unemployed 
army. Just across the Pennsylvania border in Beaver Falls, a city with a long 
tradition of trade unionism, workers gave such assistance to Coxey’s Army that one 
Pittsburgh Post writer observed, “There is existing between workingmen an affinity 
that on such occasions as this makes them all of kin… the great preparations that 
had been made was entirely due to the fact that many of the working men here had 
an honest desire to give to their kind.”87 Many local unemployed opted to join the 
march to Washington. There were similar scenes in Allegheny City and Pittsburgh, 
despite heavy police presence arrayed to deter any potential outbursts of working 
class radicalism. In a rally in support of the industrial army marchers, local 
organizations of boilermakers, bakers and patternmakers each displayed their 
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union insignia. Schwantes states that, “Not since troops had returned to Pittsburgh 
from the Civil War had the area been the scene of such enthusiasm.”88  
In Pittsburgh, Grand Master Workman of the Knights of Labor James R. 
Sovereign hosted a rally for the marchers, in which he condemned the vagrancy 
laws that the city’s police attempted to use against Coxey’s Army.89 Kelley’s Army, 
marching through larger swaths of industrial America, came into greater contact 
with Knights of Labor support. In Omaha, Kelley was the invited guest speaker at a 
Knight’s gathering to discuss the question of “the principles of civil government and 
political economy.”90 In Council Bluffs, Iowa, representatives from the Central Labor 
Union, the Nebraska Federation of Labor and the Knights of Labor were delegated 
the responsibility of hosting Kelley’s Army, providing them entertainment and 
assistance to any ill marchers.91  In St. Louis, the city’s Trade and Labor Council, the 
Knights of Labor and the German Arbeiter Verbund also provided for the marching 
unemployed workers.92  
All these currents of political and labor activism intersected in Homestead, 
Pennsylvania in April. The army’s march through Homestead was a demonstration 
of the transformation the American working class had made from the equal rights 
tradition to the national political focus of Coxey’s movement. Into the early 1890s, 
the Homestead community had been largely controlled by workers and its union, 
the A.F.L.-affiliated Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steelworkers. The 
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steelworkers had also forged a long-standing alliance with the Republican Party, 
based on a shared commitment to high import tariffs and the equal rights tradition 
embodied by the party of Lincoln. In the 1892, the iron mill workers were decisively 
beaten by Homestead plant managers Henry Clay Frick and Andrew Carnegie. When 
Frick refused to agree to a collective bargaining agreement with Amalgamated 
Association of Iron and Steelworkers, the workers at the steel mills violently 
resisted management’s attempts to requisition control of the factories. Though the 
steelworkers believed they had acted patriotically, upholding their republican rights 
as workers and citizens by repelling Pinkerton Agents with rifles, Democratic 
Governor Pattison ultimately ordered the state militia to protect company property 
and allow for the maintenance of production, spelling defeat for the striking 
workers.93 
During the strike, workers believed that the intervention of state troops 
would actually benefit their cause, as they were confident the militia would uphold 
equality of the law and worker control of the factories. Upon defeat, however, the 
workers learned that the law was actually meant to protect the property of 
management and their local efforts were powerless against the strength of the 
Carnegie steel corporation. A decisive shift in worker ideology ensued. Even as the 
Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steelworkers disbanded and control of local 
politics went to management, workers in Homestead moved into more radical 
terrains of resistance. The equal rights Republican Party was abandoned, 
temporarily for the Democrats but later for the Populist and eventually the Socialist 
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Party of Eugene Debs.94 In 1894, the ideological transformation of Homestead 
steelworkers contributed to the town being a hotbed of support for Coxey’s Army. 
As Coxey and his men marched into the beleaguered steel town in early April, 
they were greeted with a banner reading “Homestead Believes in Coxey’s Good 
Roads Bill.”95 A massive crowd filled the town’s streets to get a glimpse of the 
marchers and show their support. At a meeting held in the local Opera House, 
wagonloads of supplies were given to Coxey’s Army for the remainder of the trip to 
Washington. Homestead became a large recruiting ground for the industrial army as 
well. Elmer E. Bales, a former advisory member for the Amalgamated Association 
recruited unemployed steel workers to the join the movement. McMurry claims that 
at Homestead, Coxey’s contingent reached its largest number of recruits, estimated 
between five hundred to seven hundred members.96 Marcus, Bullard and Moore 
state that the large-scale support in Homestead for the Industrial Army Movement 
resulted from the workers seeing “Coxey’s March as an opportunity to link their 
complaints about the company with a broader social movement.”97 This is no doubt 
true but the town’s mobilization indicates an ideological alignment as well. The 
workers at Homestead supported Coxey’s Army because their defeat demonstrated 
how political and civil rights did not lead to worker’s control in the factory, and that 
state power was needed to assist wage-earners in the evolving industrial economy.  
Flush with new recruits from Homestead, Coxey and his men marched 
onward to Washington. There, they would present their petition in boots with actual 
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unemployed workingmen standing before the republic’s leaders as physical 
evidence of the devastation the current economic system reaped on America’s 
villages and cities. On May 1st, they would test their great experiment to see whether 
average American citizens could lay claim to the “people’s property,” as the 
marchers termed Congress, and alter the legal and social structures of the preceding 
century in favor of wageworker protections. 
Conclusion 
In August of 1893, just after the onset of the Depression, violence erupted in 
the streets of Chicago. Though the city was hosting the extravagant Columbus 
Exposition celebrating four hundred years of European civilization in America, the 
gratuitous poverty resulting from the economic downturn could not be hidden. 
Trainloads of unemployed from neighboring towns brought in people looking for 
work at the exposition, most of who would be disappointed and left homeless in 
Chicago’s streets. Municipal aid was drying up and the Knights of Labor Committee 
of Relief and Public Safety was inadequate to provide for the thousands of 
unemployed workingmen throughout the city. By late August, four hundred laid-off 
packinghouse workers, chanting “We want work,” began battling with police. Nine 
ended up wounded, but the outbreak was one of several violent episodes on the 
Chicago lakefront packinghouse that summer. Nearby these riots was the 
inauguration of the Congress of Labor, which hosted speakers such as Florence 
Kelley, Samuel Gompers and Terence V. Powderly. The evidence of the social ills 
plaguing American society was visible for the Congress goers, illustrating the 
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volatility unleashed by the Depression of 1893.98 Around the same time, Secretary of 
State Walter Gresham warned that “the symptoms of revolution” were ubiquitous.99   
The violence in Chicago that summer was a foil to the type of activism that 
the Industrial Army Movement actively sought to foster. The Chicago Tribune 
denounced the unemployed packinghouse workers as “’Anarchists and loafers’ who 
were agitating for insurrection rather than looking for work.” The industrial armies 
tried to avoid that tarring brush, more or less maintaining order, sobriety and an 
image of dignity as they marched across the nation. The culmination of all these 
efforts was to take place in Washington D.C. on May Day, where Congress would see 
the “honorable men and breadwinners” and legislate a government jobs program to 
relieve the unemployed.  
As the army entered the capital city, they had nearly run out of food and 
faced the real possibility of starvation. On April 30th, tensions ran high in the 
Massillon ranks, as there was inadequate food and shelter for the marchers while 
Coxey and Browne spent the night in a hotel.100 However, food eventually arrived 
and on the bright, sunny morning of May 1st, the five hundred followers of Coxey’s 
industrial army set worth for the Congress building. An estimated twenty thousand 
spectators lined the streets of the capitol hoping to catch a glimpse of the men. One 
correspondent described the crowd as sympathetic to the marchers and, as one 
interviewee stated, “that nearly all the people he knew were on Coxey’s side.” 
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Coxey’s Army also garnered the support of Washington’s African American 
community. The night before, an industrial army of all black workers, led by 
Ferdinand Warner, joined up with Coxey’s contingent and accompanied them into 
Washington. Upon entering the capitol, a crowd of black spectators cheered in 
support of the marchers, one of who told a reporter that “The working people are on 
his side.”101 These demonstrations of sympathy continued the pattern of working-
class solidarity with the industrial armies into the nation’s capitol.   
However, also greeting Coxey’s Army were three to four hundred police 
forming a human barrier between the marchers and the Capitol Dome. Carl Browne 
had received a latter the day before from the sergeant of the Washington police 
warning that an attempt to make a speech on the steps of the capitol would be 
grounds for arrest, which it in fact was, based on an 1882 law. But preparations for 
the industrial army surpassed mere police supervision, as federal troops at local 
barracks were put in a state of readiness and the Treasury Department was flanked 
with weapons to repel a mob invasion. Police chiefs also expressed their fears of the 
city’s black population, nearly half of whom were unemployed, becoming carried 
away with the unemployed marchers’ political fervor.102 As Coxey’s Army made its 
way before Congress, the center of national authority appeared less as “the people’s 
property,” and more as an entrenched fortressed shielded by bayonets and 
nightsticks.   
The foreboding display of an armed police force did not dissuade Coxey and 
Browne from fulfilling their mission of presenting their grievances and solutions 
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before Congress. But as the political agitators headed towards the steps of the 
legislature, they were rebuffed by police. After a moment of confusion, the police 
had enough and chased down Browne, which precipitated a melee. Shortly 
afterward, “The police lost their heads. They charged into the crowd, beating 
everyone within range; mounted officers rode down men, women and children, 
people dropped to their knees, dazed by repeated blows from billy clubs.”103 Coxey 
managed to escape, but he was charged with trespassing on Washington property, 
for setting foot on park grass, and was sent to prison to await trial. Thus ended the 
movement’s hopes of gaining entrance to the capitol building. 
Coxey’s arrest provoked uproar in the nation’s labor press, which came down 
heavily upon the Washington D.C. police. The Knights’ Journal condemned the police 
“brutality,” which was really “lawlessness in the guise of law.” The incarceration of 
Coxey and Brown for merely ascending the steps of Congress was an illustration of 
“the degradation to which American citizenship has sunk.”104 Populist Senator 
William Allen of Nebraska served as Coxey’s defense during his trial and introduced 
a resolution to the Senate to form a committee that would investigate the arrest of 
Coxey and Browne “to prevent a repetition of such outrages on the rights of 
American citizens hereafter.”105 Coxey, Browne and another leader of the 
Commonweal were all convicted, though the Journal dismissed the trial as a “farce,” 
and proclaimed that just as Coxey was sentenced, “So was John Brown hung.”106 The 
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conviction of the top leaders of the Commonweal spelled the demise of the 
movement, but the whole affair offered labor more evidence that republican 
institutions were corrupted and usurped by the wealth.  
With their leaders in jail, Coxey’s followers set up camp and waited for the 
armies from the West to arrive, surviving on relief from the municipal government 
and citizens of Washington D.C. Over May and June, the capitol swarmed with the 
nation’s unemployed as Fry’s and other armies decamped. But the jobless that had 
already settled viewed newcomers as competitors for dwindling supplies and food, 
and morale quickly dissipated. Worst of all, Congress did nothing to relieve the 
plight of the unemployed workers outside their windows or in the nation at large. 
Congressman Bourke Cockran of New York dismissed the poor and hungry tramps 
camping in Washington as “a good joke. [Coxey] and his so-called army are simply 
ridiculous… If the 28,000,000 working people really indorse the Coxey idea I think 
they should have chosen better representatives.”107 The Industrial Army Movement, 
the hope of the nation’s unemployed industrial workers, had made it to Washington, 
but only as a tired, hungry and defeated group of citizens.  
As the summer of 1894 wore on, provisions began to run out at the camps 
and the numbers of dwellers steadily decreased. The hopes of the jobless marchers 
faded quickly as food was given in smaller and fewer portions, while some campers 
were arrested for vagrancy and placed in poorhouses. Yet the men maintained their 
poise and discipline, respecting the property of locals near the camp and avoiding 
arrest, even though jail would secure regular meals and shelter. By August, it 
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became clear Congress was not going to legislate a public jobs program. However, 
the campers did not clear out voluntarily but were evicted by Baltimore and Virginia 
police. The only embrace the national government bestowed upon the unemployed 
industrial armies was cold indifference and police repression. But by the middle of 
that summer, a different story had taken the nation’s attention and highlighted the 
revolutionary importance of the non-violent army that was at that very moment 
retreating from Washington.    
The Pullman Strike that erupted in early May was an example of the old type 
of labor activism that the Industrial Army Movement had tried to move beyond. 
Pullman railroad workers, organized by the American Railway Union, had suffered 
from the Depression of 1893, having their wages reduced to one to two dollars a 
week. Many Pullman workers lived in the heavily paternalistic Pullman village, 
where daily life was organized under the watchful eye of company management. 
When wages were slashed and rents, which were automatically deducted from 
workers’ salaries, remained high, a work stoppage ensued. Beginning on May 12th, 
striking Pullman workers attempted to exhibit control of their workspace, blocking 
nearly all railroad traffic into Chicago. Like other instances of labor agitation of the 
period, Pullman workers demonstrated their frustration with voluntary strikes, 
local efforts of resistance and violent property destruction. This strategy courted 
disaster. Legal precedent in the late nineteenth century was strongly dedicated to 
free labor and equal rights ideals, treating organized labor’s attempts to regulate the 
wage market and worksites as violations of management’s claim to property and the 
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individual’s right to freely contract their labor.108 Accordingly, in early July, Attorney 
General Olney successfully obtained a court injunction against the A.R.U. for 
blocking delivery of federal mail. The following day, President Cleveland ordered 
fourteen thousand federal troops to disperse the crowd and maintain railway 
service to Chicago, despite the objections of Democratic Governor Altgeld. Less than 
a week later, the Pullman strike had been violently suppressed, and the clash 
between workers and U.S. troops had led to the deaths of thirty-four of those 
involved.109 110  
The violent Pullman Strike capped off a nearly two-decade era marked by 
similar acts of labor militancy. And as the strike in Chicago demonstrated, this 
category of labor activism repeatedly resulted in overbearing state suppression. The 
Pullman Strike along with the Industrial Army Movement was a turning point in 
labor activism, which is demonstrated in Eugene Debs’s turn towards national 
politics. After Pullman, Debs and many others believed attempts by workers to exert 
control over their workplaces, violently or even non-violently, would only 
perpetuate frustration and bloodshed. The equal rights tradition and labor’s 
strategy of controlling production without appropriation of federal authority had 
proven a failure for American workers. The limitation of state action to merely 
equalizing application of the law thwarted working class aspirations as the belief in 
the republican right to control over one’s worksite clashed with management’s legal 
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claims to sole authority over its property. After a brief stint with the Populist Party, 
Debs formed the Socialist Party of America and would run for national office several 
times over the next decades, garnering the support of millions of working class 
Americans. The national political goals of the Socialist Party revealed a new era in 
American labor activism, one that saw the intervention of federal authority as 
necessary to protect the status of industrial wage-laborers. 
The Industrial Army Movement facilitated the transition from the equal 
rights tradition to labor’s mobilization for federal government power. It was this 
campaign of unemployed industrial workers that highlighted the necessity of 
national political authority to shield wage-earners from the unpredictable market 
forces that wrought volatile consequences for American wageworkers. Illustrated in 
the visions of Coxey, Fry and Kelley is a realization that a national, wage market 
based on free labor principles would be tolerable for workers only if the national 
government operated as a protective agent for laborers. They viewed such a 
political development as necessary to maintain the integrity of the American 
republic. One could dismiss the strategy of the Industrial Army Movement as too 
institutionalized and accommodating to the free market and individualist principles 
that governed politics and society during the Gilded Age. But what is crucial to 
remember is that the movement’s demands sought to overcome the dominant legal 
concepts era, based on abstract notions free labor and equality before the law. The 
movement also presaged the massive growth of federal intervention in the wage 
market during the twentieth century, and even the government jobs program of the 
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New Deal. For that, the Industrial Army Movement is a landmark in American labor 
activism.  
The strategy of the Commonweal integrally shaped its procedures and 
behavior. The ever-looming possibility of federal suppression that travelled with the 
industrial armies necessitated discipline within the ranks. Thus, the leaders and the 
participants themselves marshaled the tradition of working class respectability to 
win the affection of the media, national political leaders and the American people. 
The Industrial Army Movement, in its essence, was a fresh attempt by workers from 
all over the United States to claim the republic they believed had been taken from 
them by the wealthy and powerful, and to have their democratic government 
protect their dignity as workers and as American citizens. That the movement 
unfolded with comparatively few arrests and fatalities indicates, in some sense, the 
success of the Industrial Army Movement. 
It would be easy to view the movement as a failure. No national, government 
jobs program ensued, no inflationary measures were enacted and no Congressional 
legislation resulted from the movement. But this is an indictment of Gilded Age 
politics and the conservatism of the Cleveland Administration and the two dominant 
parties in Congress. The Industrial Army Movement was the first march on 
Washington in the nation’s history. Standing before the nation’s leaders, hungry and 
homeless, the participants of the movement acted as representatives of the nation’s 
unemployed and working poor. That they were met with police clubs and an 
indifferent national legislature reveals the sobering realities of life in Gilded Age 
America. General Charles Kelley told the Ottumwa Daily Courier in May of 1894 that 
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the industrial armies “are not an agitative body, we are a living, moving object 
lesson. You can look at us and say there is a condition and not a theory.”111  There 
was, actually, both a theory and a lesson. The theory was the possibilities opened by 
working class control over the American political system. The lesson was that 
cultural, political, legal and social barriers stood between that theory and its 
practice. Coxey’s Army and the Industrial Army Movement of 1894 tested the 
democratic capacity of the American political system, and its shortcomings are a 
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